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References1. Introduction
The deterioration of the natural environment constitutes one of the major challenges
fa,ing public policy toda~. Indeed, environmen[al policy has raised many important economic
issues, especiall~ in the small open economies of Western and Northern Europe. In particular,
business groups are concerned that environmental protection induces both capital flight and
major losses in pri~ate income. Environmental groups, in contrast, maintain that a more
ambitious en~ ironment~l policy may not impose large costs. In particular, en~ ironmental
taxation may be attracti~e, especially for the high-[ax countries of ~~estern and Northern
Europe. In these countries, the argument goes, the revenues from environmental taxes could be
used to cut the high lesels of distortionan~ taxation. In this way, pollution taxa[ion would yield
not only a cleaner en~ ironment but also a less distortionary tax system. .Accordingly, public
spending would become easier to Cinance, allowing for a rise in public spending on important
public priorities. Alternati~ely, [he welfare gains associated wíth a less distortionarc tax s}stem
could be allowed to boost prisate ra[her than public welfare. As far as the distortionan impsct
of taxation is concerned, the adverse impact of high levels of labour taxation on labour supply
and employment is of partieular concern in mos[ European countries. In this connection, some
proponents of en~ ironmental taxation maintain that moving the tax burden away from the
'desirable' acti~ity of emplo~ment toward undesirable pollution would provide a welcome
boost to emplo~ment and thus to the tax base of the public sector. In particular, changing the
tax structure awa~ from labour [axation toward environmental taxa[ion would encourage
emplo~ers to substitute labour for capi[al and other inputs, [hereb~ making production more
labour in[ensi~e. At the same time, a lower le~el of labour taxation would yield higher after-
tax ~~sges, thereby increasing the incentives to supply labour. The hypothesis that higher
pollution ta~es and lower labour taxes induced by more environmental concern boost
employment land hence the ta.e base), we call the "double di~idend" h~po[hesis.t
The present paper e.~plores the relationship between en~ ironmental externalities and
the op[imal le~el and structure of [axes and public spending. Following [he pioneering work of
Sandmo (19'~1, we in~estigate [hese issues in a second-best framework in which taxes ser~e
[he dual purpose of generating revenues and internalising environmental externalities. In
contrast to most of [he literature on optimal taxation, we do not just characterise the first-
order eonditions but also explore how ~arious shocks affect optimal decísions on taxes, public
spending, and en~ ironmental polícy. Besides the consequences for the public finances, the
macroeconomic implications for employment and international capital flows are also analysed.
Bo~enberg and ~an der Ploeg (199~) adopt a similar framework to examine
em ironmental polic} in a closed economy with consumption externalities. They find that a
t Our compe[iti~e model of the labour market does not allow for in~oluntary
unemplo~ment. Howe~er, from an efficiency point of view, the levels of employmen[ and
labour supply are too low due to distortionan taxes on labour.more ambitious en~ ironmental policy associated with increased environmental concern
t~pically reduces employment. In other words, the double divídend hypothesis fails. However,
they consider onl~ pollution in consumption. Moreover, labour is assumed to be the onl~ input
into production while labour productivi[y is fixed. The present paper analyses pollu[ion in
production rather than consumption. Moreover, it allows for substitution in production
between labour, capital, and a third input, natural resources, which damages the environment
~~hen used in production. y1'ithin this framestiork, a more ambitious environmental policy may
induce substitution a~~ay from resources to~ard labour, thereby making production more
labour intensive. [ndeed, it may be argued that through this channel employment may rise
rather than fall, thereby confirming the double dividend hypothesis. A second difference with
Bo~enberg and ~an der Ploeg (1992) is that we consider a small open economc instead of a
closed econom~. Opening up the economy allows us to investigate the controversial issue of
capital flight and seems more rele~ant for most European countries.
Section II presents the model of a small open econom~ which uses capital, employment
and natural resources to produce a traded consumption good. ~~elfare rises with pri~ate
consumption of produced commodities and leisure, public consumption of produced goods,
and environmental quality. En~ironmental quality worsens on account of pollution arising
from the use of natural resoures in production, but can be improved by public spending on
abatement. Section III uses this framework to find the first-order conditions characterising the
optimal Ievels of public consumption and abatement and derices expressions for the marginal
cost of public funds as ~~ell as for the optimal tax rates on labour and the use of natural
resources. Section I~ derices [he comparatice statics of pricate behaviour and optimal policies
~~ith respect [o ~arious shocks. Sec[ion V discusses the consequences of an increase in
en~ ironmental concern, pay ing particular attention to the impact on optimal environmental
and tax policy, and public consumption as well as the macroeconomic implications for
employment and capital flight. Section VI briefly examines the effects of more priorit~ for
public consumption, a higher world price for natural resources, and the discovery of new
natural resources. Section VII discusses two extensions, namely modelling pollution as a joint
output and allowing for a direct positive effect of environmental quality on production,
I1. Natural resources, employmen[ and capital in a small open economy
ll.l. ~'ctro~ral cccoiuui
~~e focus on a small open economy which can freely trade goods, capital and natural
resources (e.g., oil or natural gas) on competitive world markets. Labour is, however, immobile
interna[ionally. Nauonal income amounts to the income received by domestic residents and
mwt equal domestic demand for goods by domestic households and the domestic governmenr.
Q-F(K,tiL,R).PR~(RE-R)tPK~(KE-K)- NCtGtA, (I)3
~~ here Q. K, KE, Ph~, L, R, RE, PR~, C, G, A and N denote, respecti~ely, national income,
capital used in domestic production, the domestic endowment of capital, the world rental price
ot capital, hours worked b} each household, the use of natural resources in domestic produc-
tion', the sale of the (exogenousl endowment of domestically owned natural resources, the
uorld price of natural resources, consumption of goods by the representative household, public
consumption, public abatement, and the number of households. F(.) is concave and stands for a
neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale. An alternatire ua~ of
expressing equation ( I 1 is that net exports of goods (i.e. the trade balance of goods) must equal
net imports of natural resources and capital:
F(K.tiL.R) - ~ C - G - .A - PR- (R-RE) t PK (K-KE). (1")
Profits of firms (r) are defined as sales minus the costs of labour, natural resources and
capital -- including taxes on labour and natural resources:
tr - F(K.i~'L.RI -(wtt~) tiL -(PR~ttR) R - PK K ('-)
~here w, t~ and tR stand for the market uage, the (emplo}ers') tax rate on labour and the tax
rate on the use of nstural resources, respecti~el}. The household budget that ean be used for
consumption of goods consists of wage and profit income, lump-sum subsidies recei~ed from
the go~ernment and the return on the endo~~ments of capital and natural resources:3
C-w~Lt(I h`) [r t PK- hE t( I-,) PR REI t T (3)
where (1-L) represents the share of the national endoament of natural resources that is owned
b} private agents and T stands for the (per-capi[ai lump-sum transfers recei~ed b} each
household from the gosernment. tiote that i ma}, alterna[ivel}, be interpreted as a tax rate on
the return on the o~nership of natural resources. Equation (3) assumes tha[ each household
o~~ns an equal share of pri~ate assets. Spending of the government on public consumption,
public abatement and lump-sum transfers must be financed by taxes on labour and the use of
natural resources and b} income from the sale of natural resources owned by the go~ernment:
GtAt?~IT-t~N LttRRt~PR~ RE (4)
? tia[ural resources (RI and capital (K) ma} also be interpreted as, respectivel}, dirn and
clean capital. 1~'e are indebted to Pierre Pestieau for this interpretation.
3 w'e assume that the go~ernment cannot impose a residence-based tax on the capital
endowment (KE), beeause it cannot monitor foreign-source income.a
where ; denotes the share of the endowment of natural resources that is owned (or taxed) b}
the government. Aocording to N'alras' law, (4) follows from (I), (2) and (3).
11.?. Farror demand M firms
Firms mazimise profits under perfect competition and thus equalise the marginal
product of each factor [o its user cosr.
FK(K. NL.I.R ~~L1 - PK . FR(K,rNL,I,R!NL) - PR ttR, FNL(K;'tiL,I,R.~!~L) - wttL (~)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The first two first-order conditions vield the
demands for capital and natural resources conditional on the le~el of emplo}ment:
K,'tiL - k(PK~,PR~.tR), RiNL - r(PK~.PR~ttR). (6)
tiote that kK-FRR:O~o, kR-rK--FRK 0 and rR-FKK,'.~~0, where partial derivatives of k(.)
and r(.) with respect to PK~ and PR~.tR are denoted b} the subscripts K and R, respectively.
Concavity of the production function implies that ~-FRRFKK-FRKZ'0. Facror substitution
aw'ay from capital (natural resources) towards labour takes place if the user cost of capital
Inatural resources) rises. If capital and natural resources are coeperant factors (FRK~O), an
increase in the cost of natural resources (capital) induces substitution awac from capiml
(natural resources) towards labour. Substitution of the relati~e factor demand functions (6) into
the third first-order condition gicen in (~1 yields the factor price frontier:
w t [L - W(PK~, PR~t[R1. (7)
COns[ant returnS [0 SCale implieS that QK-(FNL,KFRR-FRKFNL,R) 0--k and
oR-lFxxF!aL,R-FsL,KFKR)!~--r where the partial deri~~atives of ~L) are denoted b}~ the
subscripts K and R. The producer wage is a negative function of both the producer cost of
natural resources and the user cost of capitaL Since the user cost of capital and the price of
natural resources are determined on global competitive markets, a gi~en tax on natural
resources (tR) uniquely determines the producer wage (wttL). Constant rewrns to scale implies
that profits (a) are zero in equilibríum.
11.3. The represenrative househotd
Preferences are weakly separable in private utilitq (the bundle of private consumption
and leisure), public consumption and environmental quality. The utility function of the
representative household can thus be written as U[M(C,V),G,E], where U[.J stands for total
utilit}', ~1(.) represents private utility, V is leisure (i.e. 1-L as the endowment of time is5
normalised at unit}), and E denotes environmental qualit}. Households are atomistic and take
the level of public eonsumption and encironmental quality as gi~en. They choose leisure and
pri~ate consumption to maximise ( pri~ate) utility subject to the budget constraint (3).
Households thw equate the marginal rate of substitution betw"een priva[e consumption and
leisure to the market Iconsumption) aage, i.e. M~;'1`1~-w". This yields the demand for goods,
[he demand for leisure, indirect private utility and indirect social utili[}:
C- c(~t'.l'), V- v(~.Y"), M- m(~',ti'), U[m(w,5").G.E] - u(w~,Y.G.E) (8)
~here priva[e non-labour income (l') is gicen b}
ti-` t[Ptc K e' ( 1-:) PR- RE] . T. (9)
The (uncompensated) Nage elasticin of labour supply is defined as eLe-w.vw, L. Ro}~'s identit}
gi~es emplo}~ment as L-uw'a where a-U~-U~~1o-uY is the marginal utility of priva[e income.
l1.4. Lahour market cyuilibrtunt
There is no international migration of labour. Hence, equilibrium on the labour market
requires thst the demand for labour from (bl must equal household supply of labour from l8):
` L - f~ L[PK~,PR~.[R] - ti (I - v(~',Y )]. (10)
Substitu[ion of the factor price frontier (7) into (10) }ields an expression for the equilibrium
le~el of domesti~all~ emplo~ed capital as a function of the producer eosts of natural resources
and capital, the ta.~ on labour, and the level of non-labour income:
K - ~ [1 - clolPh . PR .Ig)-f~.Y')] k(PK , PR~ttgl. (I I)
A higher tax on labour reduces the consumption wage. lf labour supply slopes upwards, a
lower w.age rate decreases both emplo}ment and domestically emplo}ed capital. .A higher level
of non-labour income raises [he demand for leisure (vY~O), thereby reducing emplo}ment and
capital. A higher user cost of natural resources depresses the market ~age. If capital and
natural resources are cooperant, the resulting change ín relative input prices causes the demand
for capi[al to decline relati~e to labour demand. If the labour suppl} cur~e slopes upwards, the
lower wage reduces labour supply. As both employment and the capital-labour ratio decline,
capital emplo}ed in domestic production falls. A higher cost of capital lowers the wage and, if
labour suppl} slopes upw"ards, lowers labour supply. It also induces substitution away from6
capital towards Iabwr. Accordingl~. domestically emplo~ed capital falls.
III. En~ironmental qualit~ and optimal go~ernment polic}
En~ironmental qualit~ worszns when more natural resources are used and less public
abatement is undertaken:
E- e( A)- R, e'~0, e"~0, l I~)
~~here e(.) denotes the effectiveness of public abatement.4 The go~ernment selects the le~el of
public consumption fG) and public abatement (A), the tax on labour (t~), the tax on the use of
natural resources t[RI. and [he le~el of transfers (T) to maximise social welfare, i.e.
:~u[w,Y,G,EJ, subject to the factor price frontier (7), the definition of non-labour income (9),
the ecological relationship (I~I, the demand for natural resources (tí) (in which L-1-
~[bl.)-t~.l'] has been substituted), emplo~ed capital (11), and the go~ernment budgzt constraint
(4). The go~ernment is thus able to replicate the first-best outcome in a competitire, markzt
econom~. This ma} be seen from the first-order condition for the le~el of lump-sum transfers:
tiuY-N~-O. (131
where u stands for the marginal reduc[ion in social welfare arising from raising one more unit
of public funds. The marginal cost of public funds (i.e. the ~1CPF from now on), ~-{r, a,
z~presses this fall in welfare in mone} units. Expression (13) re~eals [hat if lump-sum
subsidies and taxes are a~ailable, the shadow price of public funds (u) equals marginal private
utilit} of income (uy-A). Hence, the ti1CPF (i.e. q) is unin. In addition, the sum oC the
marginal rates of substitution bet~~een public and pri~ate consump[ion goods reduces to the
marginal rate of transformation (see (Id) below). The firct-best outcome can thus be attained
in a competiti~e marhet econom}.
The remainder of the paper, howe~er, assumes that lump-sum subsidies and taxes are
not a~aifable (i.e. T-0). Accordingly, the go~ernment has to use distortionan taxes (or
subsidies) to finance public spending. The resulting second-best allocation ~ields, of course,
IoHer social welfare than the first-best outcome.
4 Alternati~ely, we can explicitly allow for cross-border pollution by writing (12) as
E- e(A) - Rt R- Qz (RE-R) - z(A) -(~t-Qz) R- pz RE
where R1 and (i2 are the environmental damages imposed at home by one unit of resources used
domzstically and abroad, respectivel~. As long as ~1~~9y and units of ineasurement are chosen
appropriately, this is equi~alent to (12).7
lll.l. Puhlic cnir~i~mptroir mrd ahatenteitt
. ~faximisation of social uelfare with respect to the level of public consumption requires
th~t the sum of the marginal rates of subs[itution between public consumption and private
~onsumption must equal the ~1CPF:
`C~ L'MS1o-q-u'a (1J1
This is the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods modified for the absence
of lump-sum taxation. If [he ~1CPF esceeds unit} (r)~I), an increase in public consumption
esacerbates the deadweight loss of distortionar} taxation. Accordingl}, the sum of the
marginal rates of substitution between public and pri~ate consumption needs to exceed the
marginal rate of transformation (i.e. unit~ ).
The optimal le~el of publie abatement follows from setting the marginal rate of
substitution between public consumption and en~ironmental quality equal to the marginal rate
of transformation bet~~een public abatement and environmental qualit} (e'):
li~;lie - e'(A) (IS)
where e'(.A1 stands for the impro~ement in en~ironmental qualit} that can be obtained b} one
additional unit of public abatement. L'nlike (14), ll~l does not feature the MCPF because both
public consumption and puh!:~ abatement are financed b} distortionan taxation. Hence, the
~1CPF affe~ts the optimal demands for both these t}pes of public spending in similar wa}s.
lll.2. The margutra co~r r~t ~~.,~lrc ltirtdi and :he ra.r o~t the~ use~ oJ,~atu~~al re~otu~ces
The first-order condition for the optimal tax on the use of natural resources is:
[`Uw t tiL'E (R L) ~w - l~ {`[LttR(R L)J swJ JR t~R .(~ IR -`l.~E) rR 1L - O. (16)
The first-order condition for the optimal tax on labour is:
-` uw -` CE (R L Í~ w t~[ti IL.t~s w) t tR ( R L I~ w] - 0. 1 17j
L'pon substitution of (1-) into (161, we obtain
~tiL~Rt~R.(~[R-Nl1E)rRNL-O. (16')
If we make use of qR--r, the expression for the optimal tax on natural resources becomes:8
tR - (tiUE L M ~1ol (1 '~l. (18)
Substitution of t141 into 118) ~~ields:
tR-UE:U~~O.
Substituting f 18'I into ( I~), we find for the marginal produe[i~it} of abatement:
e'(A) - I tR.
(18')
Public abatement [hus increases with the tax on natural resoures.s
The optimal ta.~ on the use of natural resources is zero if environmental externalities
are absent (i.e. L'E-01. The reason is that a small open economy cannot affect the world market
price of natural resources. Hence. the resource tax is fully born by the internationally
immobile factor of production, i.e. labour, and thus amounts to an rmplrcrt labour tax. From a
re~enue-raising point of view, the ezplrcrt labour tax is a more efficient levc on labour
income; while both taxes distort labour supply by reducing the consumption wage, only the
input tax on resourees (tRl distorts production decisions.6
Appl~ing Roy's identit~ (uw-aL) to tl7), substituting (181 and dividing by~ tiaL ~ields
the following expression for the ~1CPF:
U9)
If labour supply is inelastic (eL-O), additional labour taxes do no[ affect the base of the
labour [ax and thus the ~1CPF is unit~. If' labour supply slopes upwards (c~~0), equation (19)
re~eals that a positi~e tax on labour raises the 11CPF abo~e unity. The reason is that a higher
labour ta.i depresses labour suppl~, thereby eroding the base of the distortionar~ labour tax. If,
howe~er, labour supply bends backwards Ic~c01, the negative income effect associa[ed with a
higher tax on labour boosts labour supply, thereb~ broadening the labour taz base. This causes
the S1CPF to fall below unin.
' The same first-order condition would hold if A were private abatement. In that case the
pollution tax (tR) would ha~e to be le~ied on the unabared environmencal damage (i.e. R-e(A))
rather than on the use of natural resources.
6 This is, in fac[, an application of the well-known Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) result that
production efficiency should be maintained in a second-best world. Production efficiency
requires [hat the source-based tax on capital income should be zero.9
The textbook Pigo~ ian tax rate on the use of natural resources amounts to the sum of
the marginal damages of en~ ironmental pollution expressed in mone} units rather than utility
units, i.e. NliE; l'~~0. This is the appropriate optimal tax rate on natural resources if the
!s1CPF is unit}, indicating that public funds are not scarcer than prisate funds (e.g., since
lump-sum taxes and subsidies are a~ailable or labour supply is perfectly inelastic). However,
in a second-best situation in which the go~ernment cannot rely on lump-sum instruments and
labour supplc is elasti., equation (18) shows that the optimal tax rate on the use of na[ural
resources differs from the Pigo~ ian tax rate. In particular, if labour supply slopes upwards, the
~1CPF is abo~e unit} and the optimal tax rate is lower than the Pigovian tax rate, which
measures the social damage due to the use of resources. The scarcer are public funds, the
higher is [he ~1CPF and ~rrer~s ~ar[bus the smaller becomes the optimal tax on natural
resources. The reason is that the optimal resource tax equates the social cost of environmental
damage due to resource use to the social benefits of additional tax re~enue on account of the
resource use. This implies that each unit of used resources does not have to yield as much tax
revenue if tax re~enue becomes more ~aluable as indicated by a higher !~9CPF. Intuiti~el}, the
go~ernment uses the taY s}stem to simultaneously accomplish two objecti~es, namel}, first,
raising public re~enues, and, second, internalising externalities. If public re~enues become
scarcer, as indicated b} a higher S1CPF, the tax s}stem needs to focus more on raising revenue
and less on ensironmental objecti~es. In this wa}, a high !s9CPF cuts the demand not onl} for
public consumption but also for the public good of the environment.
l~'. Comparati~e statics
To obtain anal}ti~al results, the equations describing pri~ate and public beha~iour and
market equilibrium are loglinearised. Loglinear de~ iations are denoted b} a tilde, unless
indicated othentiise. ~Ve assume perfect substitution in social utilin between private utilit},
public consumption and environmental qualit}. Hence, Uu. [J~ and liE are constants.
Furthermore, the sub-utility function M(.) is homothetic, so that Engel curves are linear. This
facilitates the anal~sis of the effects on optimal public policy and economic outcomes of
~arious shocks. In particular, section V explores the consequences of more environmental
concern (higher t,`E). Section V1 briefl} examines the effects of a higher priorit~ gi~en [o
public consumption (higher U~). It also in~estigates the implica[ions of increases in the world
price of natural resources and the endowment of natural resources. In anal}sing these latter
shocks, we assume [hat [he go~ernment owns (tazes away) all na[ural resources (;-1).
~f'.I. Household behariour
Loglinearisation of the household budget constraint (3) yields:lo
c - ~L (wtL), aL-wL 'c~o
where ,'3L stands for the share of labour income in total household income. The firs[-order
conditions gise asi 1(C-~') - à, where a~t denotes the elasticity of substitutíon between C and
V in private utilit} ~1L). Together with the equilibrium condition VVtLL-O, we obtain the
changes in pri~are conswnpti' vn, leisure, labour supply and private utilit}:
C - ~L(IreL) w, -(L ~V)eL w, L- EL w, M- ll-~y)QL w" lg'")
where a~.-w~'(Cfw~"i ~.-~ 3L(Lt~';3L1-t stands for the share of leisure in private utilit} and
eL-~'lo,~t-;3Li(L.~'r~Ll 1 is the (uncompensated) wage elasticity of labour supply. Hence, the
labour suppl} slopes upwards (bends backwards) if the elasticin of substitution between
leisure and private consumption goods in private utilit}~ (aM) is greater (less) than the share of
labour income in to[al household income ( ~L). In that case, the substitution effect dominates (is
domina[ed b} ) the income effect. In general, the wage elasticity of labour supply rises with the
ratio of non-labour to labour income. Pri~ate utilit} rises but the marginal private utility of
mone} income falls with the consumption wage (w.l:
a - ~10 - (~y ati) (~~-C) - - rY~ w - - u~.[( I-~p)~L]-t M- (~0)
II'.?. Faitor demmtd and the Jactor prire Jrontier
The change in the demand for natural resources can (bp using (6)) be written as:
R ~(I-!'R) PR t IR~ eR--FKh(r~)-i(PR-ttRUO (6")
~~here tR-dtR tPR ttRi and ~R-tR IPR~ttRl. The factor price frontier (7) }ields:
w~ -- 6R [(1-tiR) PR~ t tRj - tL, bR-(PR~ttRlriw~0 (7~~)
where tL-dtL w. The consump[ion wage (w) [hus declines if firms face a higher cost of natural
resoures or a higher ta~ on labour.
Il ~. ~. .tlarker equtlrh, runr mrd rhe ~orernn:enr budget
Loglinearising the national income identity ( 1) or (1'), w~e arrive aC
~L 1- t trR6R R t I~RE-cYR(1 "tR)] PR- t~RE RE -~C C t wC G t U;A A ( 1~~)11
~~ here the national income shares of labour, the domestic use of natural resources, the
endowment of natural resources, pri~ate consumption, public consumption, and public
abatement are defined as nL-(wt[L)`~L~Q~ aR-(PR.'tR)R~Q~ ~Re-PR~Re~Q, ~c-NC'Q.
~o-G Q and wA-A Q, respectivelc. Substitution of (6"), (7") and (8") into ( 1") and use of
QL~y~-(1-bLIQL, where SL-tL(wttL)-t, gives
~.~G t wA.A - ~1 {ILtdR[I I-6RIPR~t[R]) - aRBRER[(I-6R)PR.ttR] t[~RE-~R(l-tR)]PR~ t~RERE,
~1~ - (I-9L)oL - cL(~LBL.~RBR). (~I1
B~ the law of 1~alras, equation (~I) corresponds also to the loglinearisation of the go~ernment
budge[ constraint 1-7). Public spending is finaneed b}, on the one hand, the sale of the
endowment of national natural resources and, on the other hand, b} both an implicit labour
tax, i.e. the tax on the use of natural resources, and an explicit tax on labour. The first term in
~~ captures the taz rate effect (i.e. the re~enue effect ceteris paribus the tax base), while the
second term in ~~ stands for the tax base effect (i.e. the revenue implications of a change in
emplo~'ment, which constitutes the base of both the implicit and the explicit labour tax). A
higher tax rate on labour reduces the consumption wage and, if the labour suppl}' cune slopes
upwards (bends backuards), reduces Iraises) Iabour suppl}'. Hence, tax re~enues rise less
(more) than proportionally. Compared to the labour tax, the resource tax produces an
additional ad~erse effect on the tax base; b} encouraging producers to substitute awa} from
natural resources, the base of [he pollution tax is eroded. This additional substitution effect
explains wh~ a tax on natural resources is less efficient in raisíng public re~enue than a tax on
labour. To rule out a downward-sloping Laffer-cune for the labour tax, we assume that .~-~0.
JI ~..J. Ta.c on nctur~,l rc'xnu'ces rtitd puhltc ahatemenf
Loglinearisation of ( IS"~ ~ iel~s the change in the tax on the use of natural resources:'
R - BR (L'g - L'~). 118")
Loglinearising (1 ~'1 and then substituting (18"), we find for the change in public abatement:
' A CES sub-utilit} function for collective goods, sa} H-(ryoG~tryEE~)t~~. ;~1, gives
[R - AR [lltryg'(OS-1) t)ig - lIf7G'(OS-1)-t]ryG f OS-1 (G - E)}
where os-(1-ti)-t~0 stands for the elasticity of substitution between public consumption and
environmental qualit}, ~)o'-GH~;H-ryo[ry~tryE(E;'G)f]"1 and ryE'-1-ryo'. A higher level of
public ~onsumption relative to encironmental quality induces the government to shift attention
to environmental polic} and impose a higher resource tax, particularly if oS is low. We assume
in [his paper, however, os~oo and [hus that (IS") holds.-i - (tR "RI aA - (CE-Lo) aA, aA--Ae" e'~O. O5")
A higher utilit} weight for en~ironmental qualit} or a lower priorit} for public consumption
encourages the go~ernment to undertake more abatement, particularlp if the elasticit} of the
producti~ it~ of public abatement (oA) is low. Intuitiveh, a higher priorit} for the environment
makes the output of public abatement (i.e. a cleaner en~ironment) more valuable while a lower
priorit~ for publi~ consumption crowds in other t}pes of public spending.
It'.~. Prrhlrc conitrn:~trurr. enrrrarnierrralytmlin artd prrrate utr(rti~
B~ substituting ( I S'), (7") and ( 18") into the government budget constraint (' I I, we
~ol~e for public consumption in terms of the consumpiion wage. Lsing ( 8") to express ~ in
terms of ~1 gi~es the change in public consumption in terms of the change in pri~ate uti)it~:
~~ G-- 0~[( I-~~.)~L] t ~4 -(yAOA"tt~R9RCR)5R (liE-L~)
- r~R~ReR( 1-"R I PR. `[~RE-~R( I-~RI] PR~t ~RE RE.
Loglinearisa[ion of i 1~ I and making use of ( 15'J ~ ields:
Qe ~~ .~ - 6RaR R. (t„)
where uE-tRE Q stands for the salue of the environment as a fraction of national ineome.
Substituting i6") into ( I„) }ields:
YF. t - ya "R~R 1- t bR`7RrR (1I-`-'R)PR- t IR].
Hence, environmental qualit~ impro~es through more abatement, a higher cost of natural
resources and a lower le~el of emplo~ment. Substituting (8"), (1~") and ( I8") into (1„'), we can
write the change in environmental qualit} in terms of the change in pricate utilit} and
exogenousshocks:
~E E - --"R~R`t.I(I-~`,13~]-1 ~9 , (~;AOA-1.rsRER'cR) (LE-U~). 9R~ReR(I-tiR) PR . (~il
Expressions (~~J and t-~) summarise the trade-offs between the three components of social
welfare (cr-. private utilitp, en~ironmental qualit} and public consumption) that follow from
the resource constraints facing the small open econom}. In particular, a higher level of private
utility (corresponding to lower tax rates and a higher consumption wage) reduces public
consumption (see 1~~)i and, if the labour curve slopes upwards (downwards), worsens
(improves) en~ironmental qualit} (see (~3)). .A higher priori[} to environmental qualit} (higher13
UE) or a lower priorit} to public consumption (lower U~) raises the level of public abatement
:ind, for a gisen le~el of prisate utilit}, crowds out public consumption and boosts
emironmental qualit}. At a given level of private welfare, discoven of new natural resources
(higher RE) boosts public consumption (see (~~)). Intuitively, a greater endowment of natural
resources enriches the domesuc econom}. The addi[ional wealth can be used to either raise
pri~ate welfare (i.e. the tax rate falls) or public welfare (i.e. public consumption rises).
A higher price of natural resources on the world market causes the economv to become
richer (poorer) if the countn is a net exporter (importerl of natural resources. Given the le~el
of pri~a[e wetfare, the terms of trade gain (loss) implies a higher (lower) level of public
consumption. At the same time, a higher price for natural resources causes production to
become less resour.e intensi~e. On the one hand, this benefits the en~ironment (see (~3)1 On
[he other hand, ho~~e~er, the ta.~ base erodes, therebp depressing public revenues and thus
reducing public consumption for a gi~en level of pri~ate welfare (see (22)).
1!'.6. The dentand jor prtrate utilrtr rntodrjied Scmuelson rule~
In order [o anal}se the optimal trade-off between the three components of social
utilit}, we loglinearise ( Idl and substitute (ZO)
[:31( l-us.)1-[ ~`1 - ~v-t 10-Uo). i,a)
Relationship (~-I) can be viewed as the "demand" cur.e for private utility (see Figure I).
~ccording to the modified Samuelson rule (14), a higher MCPF requires marginal utilit} of
public consumption to rise relati~e to marginal utilin~ of pri~are consumption. Since marginal
utilit~ of public consumption, L'~, is fixed, marginal utilit} of pri~ate consumption must
deoline. This requires a rise in the lesel of pri~ate welfare. Hence, the demand cune tor
pri~a[e utilin slopes upwards.
For a gi~en ~iCPF ( i.e. i)-0), a lower priorit} for public consumption (i.e. U~~O)
implies that pri~ate welfare must rise to reduce marginal utilit} of pri~ate consumption so as
to meet (~41. This preference shock thus shifts out the demand curve for private utilit}.
ll'.'. Tht~ mar~rna! cust oj publrc funds
The MCPF, r), is given b~ equation ( 19). Loglinearising this ezpression and using the
factor price frontier ( ?") to eliminate tL, He arri~e ar.
~l - ~IeL( 1 -BL) t {BL cL - w' - (CYR;~~L) ~( 1 -BR) PR~ t tR]} ( 19~)
where we have used 11-5L)bR-aR~aL and where the labour [ax rate is defined by 6L-tL, (wttL).14
Substituting (8") and ( 18") into (19"), we find how the `1CPF saries:
v-- nEyt 1-By)-t [( 1-~s.)-tRy-t M t( ~R,'uy) (BR (lJE - Uo) f( 1-BR) PR~)1 (l9"1
~~here we ha~e assumed that labour suppl} exhibits a constant (uncompensated) wage elasticity
tcy-0i.s Expression 119") re~eals ho~~ the b1CPF ~aries with the level of prisate utilin. W'e
can graph this relationship as the "cost" cur~e in Figure 1. If the uncompensated wsge elasticit}
of labour suppl} is positi~e Inegati~e), the cost curve slopes downwards (upwards). Intuiti~el},
a positi~e (negati~e) w'age elasticit} implies that a high level of (distortionary) labour taxation
raises (reduces) the ~1CPF b} eroding (widening) the base of the distortionary labour tax (see
expression (19)). .-~[ a gisen resource tax, a higher level of prisate utilit} requires a higher
consumption wage tsee 18"1) and thus a lotier distortionar} tax Isee, e.g., expression (7")),
thereb} reducing (raising) the ~1CPF. Given the level of private utility (and thus the wage
IeseU, a higher resoure tax, corresponding to a higher priority to the environment or a lower
priorit} to public consumption, allows for a lower distortionar}~ (labour) tax rate (see (7")). The
11CPF thus declines (risesi and the cost cur~e shifts downwards (upwards).
Il'.ó. Soltuion
The sclution for the changes in pri~ate utitih and the marginal cost of public funds
corresponds to the intersection of demand curse, ('4), and the cost cune. (19"), i.e. point E in
Figure 1. Subsequentl}, 18") can be used to find the changes in the consumption wage, pri~ate
consumption, leisure and emplo}ment, (~~j to arri~e at the change in public consumption, and
(~31 to find the change in environmental qualit}. Solving (~41 and (19"), we find:
'7 -
o-- [ey~~-t L'o t (eyQR ay) {BR (U~-Ce) - (1-NR) PR~)1
[~t,(1-ot~~]-1 ~1 - w - .S (Qy~~) t [J~ U~ . cyaR (6R GE t (1-6R) PR }l (~6)
where we assume ~~~-[I-9y(Itey)fey a~]"1-[(I-By)n~ltcy a~]-t~0.9 tiote [hat private utilit}.
b This implies that the elasticin oN is not constant but changes so as to keep ey constant.
For a similar approach, see ~b'ildasin (199~). Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1992) adopt an
alternati~e approa~h b~ assuming that au is constant. In that case, ey varies (e.g. ey-V if rton-
labour household income is zero or full} taxed awa}, i.e. Ry-l). Empirical studies do not
pro~ide much guidance on how labour suppl} elasticities change with the level of labour
suppl}. Furthermore, we expect [hese changes in elasticities to be onlp of minor importanee --
especially if the initial tax rate of labour (By) is small.
9 This is the case if oM~pyBy. This condition is met if BL and py are small or if the wage
elasticit} of labour suppl} is pos~[ive (i.e. oM~py). In case 0' ~0, the cost curve slopes upwards
and is s[eeper than the demand curve. The model is then unstable; a higher level of private
welfare raises the MCPF, [hereb} making pri~ate consumption more attractive and thus raisingthe consumption ~~aee and the ~1CPF are unaffected b~ a discoven of new natural resources.
~~. Increased concern for en~ironmental quality
I J. Emironmentaf poltc}: Higher ta.r on resources mtd ntore abatentent
Greener preferences (i.e. higher UE) make environmental policy more ambitious; the
ta~ on the use of natural resources rises ( see (18")) and the level of abatement expands (see
(1~"J). Hence, the go~ernment should adopt a mix of environmental policc instruments.
~'. Lu~rrr lchour tax rate mtd lo~ier entplu~'ntertt: Failure oJ the douh(e dicidettd hrputhests
The impaet on the rate of labour taxation (SL-tL (wttL)) is found from
- ll-9y) [(1-5y16L't
Eliminating tL from (ï"1, using ( 18") and substituting (?6) for w, we arri~e ar.
1~')




Hence, a rise in en~ironmental concern reduces the labour tax rate as non-distortionar~
en~ ironmen[al [axes replace (distortionar~ l labour taxes.
Substituting 1,6) inro (8"), we find that, despite the lower labour [ax rate, emplo}ment
declines as preferences become greener (higher UE):
1- --.~ ~(nL~~,)-t jcL-'rYR (9R Ue t(I-5R) PR~} t eLJ~ L~G). (,9)
Hence, the double di~ idend hcpothesis fails. OnI~ if labour suppl~ is completel~ inelas[ic (i.e.
eL-O) is emplo~ment unaffected. ln all other cases, an increase in environmental coneern harms
emplo~ment. Intuiti~el~, the higher ta.~ on resources is shifted onto the only internationall~
immobile fac[or Ii.e. labour). An alternative wa~ of interpreting the failure of the double
di~ idend h~ pothesis is that a relocation from the consumption of produced goods to that of
leisure indirectl} benefits the en~ ironment. In particular, the consumption of leisure does not
pollute the en~ ironment. Employment, in contrast, harms the environment because it expands
[he demand for natural resources (see expressions (6") and (12")). .Accordingl}, the use of
natural resources falls for t~o reasons if environmental concern rises. First, the le~el of
emplo~ment and [hus output declines (i.e. the output effect). Second, gi~en the level of output,
che higher pollution [ai encourages firms to substitute away from natural resources (i.e. the
the ~1CPF further. Appeal to Samuelson's correspondence principle suggest that we must
assume J~~~O.16
substitution effect). The en~ironment thus benefits from both a lower lcre! and a cleaner
cuntpos,trvn (i.e. less resource intensive production and more public abatement) of activity.
f.3. Do green pulicres cause capital jlight'
We use (6) to arri~e at an expression for the change in domestically emplo}ed capital:
h- L-~KR I( I-dg) PR f tg) l~0)
Hhere EKR-FRKIPR t[R) k:~~ iS positive (negative) if capital and natural resources are
(non)cooperant production factors. Just as in Ihe case of resource demand, an output and a
substitution effect de[ermine the impact on the domestic demand for capitaL First, greener
preferences reduce employment and output, thereb~ depressing the demand for capital.
Second, firms change their input mix in response to the higher user price for resources and
lo~er labour costs. In particular, if resources and capital are (non)cooperant production
factors, firms substitute away from (to~ards) capital. Hence, a greater concern for the
environment typically induces capi[al flight. The only exception is if labour supply is inelastic
(cL is small in absolute value, i.e. oM~p~). Moreo~er, resources and capital should be
noncooperan[ factors of production. This is the case if resources and capital are weakly
separable from labour in production and, at the same time, resources and capital are close
substitutes while the composire of resources and capital is a poor substitute for labour. In [hat
case, firms substitute capi[al rather than labour for resources if they face a higher cost of
resource use and lo~er labour costs. In particular, the condition for capital demand to rise if
labour supplc is inelastic is oK~o~ a~~, where oK is the substitution elasticity between
resources and capital, o~ denotes the corresponding elas[icity between labour and the resource-
capital composite, and a~~-(wttLltiL; F(K,NL,R) stands for the labour share in production.
Accordingly, in contrast to the demand for labour and resources, capital demand may rise if
particular production conditions hold. In most cases, however, the demands for all three inputs
into production decline. Furthermore, production t}pically becomes more labour and less
resource intensi~e as wage costs fall and the cost of using resources rises.
Greener preferences reduce the import of natural resources and, t}picall~, encourage
capital flight. It thus follows that the trade balance for exports and imports of goods mo~es
into deficit. Intuiti~ely, a more ambitious environmental policy makes domestíc production
less attractive so that a farger share of domestic endov`ments of capital and natural resources is
employed abroad. The (factor) income from abroad is used to import consumption goods.
1'.4. Do;ree,t policre~s hurt pricate utrlrti'
The impact on private utility depends on the sign of the uncompensated wage elasticity17
of labour suppl~, cL. If this elasticity is positive (negative), greener preferences reduce (raise)
pri~ate utilit~. Intuiti~el~', [he higher environmental tax allows for a lower distor[ionary tax on
labour. According to expression (19), this reduces (raises) the MCPF if the labour suppl~
slopes upwards (downwards). A lower (higher) MCPF expands [he public sector (pri~'ate
u[ilit}~) at the expense of pri~~ate utilit~~ (the public sector) (see expression (24)). Graphicall~~,
greener policies shift down (up) the downward- (upward-)sloping cost curve if [he elasticity e~
is positive (nega[i~e).
t.:. Puhlrc co~rsunt~trn~i.~ .9~~~~ r~~d and gree~r prelere~rces compatrble'
Public consumption is found by substituting (26) into (22):
wG Ci -[(`~ ~.~~V)0~`-L(~R QL)-dRaRERI[BR (-~E t(I-BR) PR~I - ïAOA t6R L~E
t(rYRE-~R(1-dR)] PR~ t~RE RE 4[~~~0~-(~~try)-ttwAOA-[BRt~RBR~ERI ~.`G.
Public consump[ion rises with en~ ironmental concern if [he labour suppl} elasticity is positive
and large and, at the same time, cR and oA"1 are small. Red and green preferences are then
compatible in the sense that an increase in environmental concern expands public
consumption. The conditions for the compatibility of red and green preferences can be
explained as follows. ~~ith upward-sloping labour suppl~, the higher non-distortionan
resouree tax cuts the MCPF. This reduces the demand for private utilit~~ ( see expression (2~3)
and Figure I where the cost cune shifts down). The associated low'er consumption wage allows
for higher o~erall rates of taxation (consisting of both the explicit labour tax and [he resource
ta.c, which is an implicit labour tax, see expression (7")). ~~'ith a small eR, the change in the tax
composition awa~ from (explicit) labour taxation (see section V.~) tow'ard environmental
taxation ( see section ~.l ), does not erode the base of the recource tax much. The resource tax
is thus almost as effecti~e in raising revenues as the explici[ labour [ax. Hence, the rise in the
o~erall tax rate causes re.enues to expand, thereby boosting overall public spending. This
allows public consumption to rise because, with a small oA-t, public abatement increases onl~
marginall~ Isee expression (IS'11.
Public consumption can increase onl} if the en~ironmen[ impro~es mainl~ through a
lower le~el of economic acti~ity rather than a cleaner composition of tha[ acti~it}. In
particular, wi[h a large uncompensated wage elasticity, emplo~'ment and hence outpu[ decline
substantially (see (~911. If oA-t is small, public abatement does not expand much (see (15")).
Furthermore, production does not become much less resource intensive if the elasticit} eR is
small (see expression (6"). Hence, environmental quality is not enhanced by a cleaner
composition of economic acti~it~~ but rather b~ a lower level of that activity (see also (1?")).
ff either oA-1 or e ft are large, public consumption declines. In tha[ case, a"greener"
composition of economic activin contributes to a higher environmental quality. In particular,18
if oA~' is large, public abatement rises substantially. This both enhances environmenta] qualin
and crowds out public consumption. If the elasticit} eR is large, production becomes much less
resource intensi~e, thereby benefiting the environment. At the same time, hoHe~er, the base
of the resource tax erodes causing aggregate re~enues to fall. This drop in revenues forces the
go~ernment to cut public consumption. Intuitively, by cutting public spending, the
go~ernmen[ creates room for the private sec[or to incur [he costs associated with a cleaner
production structure. In case of a large oA~l, the cos[s associa[ed with a higher social priority
for the public good of a cleaner en~ ironment appear explici[ly on the government budget as a
higher le~el of public spending on abatemen[. In case cR is large, in contrast, the costs incurred
for a higher en~ironmen[al qualit~ are 'hidden' in the form of a larger excess burden per
addi[ional uni[ of public re~enue raised.
[f the natural resources are fossil fuels, public abatement possibilities may be limíted.
The costs associated with a cleaner composition of economic activity then do no[ appear on [he
go~ernment budget. Hence, the go~ernmen[ ma} ha~e to return to the private sector n[ore than
the addi[ional re~enues from pollution taxes, especially if eR is large and a,~ is small.
~'1. Other shocks
f'IJ. l~~ïr~~c~~~~f cnncc~rn (or publfcc'onsuntp[ron
Equations ( 18"1 and ( I~") indicate that redder preferences ( i.e. higher L:~) impl} a less
ambitious en~ironmental polic}, i.e. a lower tax rate on the use of natural resources and less
public abatement. Fur[hermore, ('8) reveals [hat the labour tax rate rises so [ha[ redder
preferences impl} a shift of taxation awa} from resources towards labour. In[uitively, the tax
s}stem focuses more on re~enue raising and less on environmen[al protection. If the labour
suppl} slopes upwards Idownwards), (~~) indicates that the MCPF rises (falls). Redder
preferences alwa}s reduce pri~ate utilit} -- see (26). Hence, as may be seen from (29),
emplo~ment falls (rises) if the labour cur~e slopes upwards ( downuards). Public consump[ion
and the aggrega[e level of public spending [hus rise -- see (31) -- a[ the expense of pri~ate
utilit~ and consumption.
The effect on environmental quality can be deduced by substituting ( '6) into (~3). If
the wage elasticity of labour suppl} (eL) is large and positi~e, the elastici[y of the effecti~eness
of abatement ( oA) is small and [he own price elasticity of [he demand for natural resources (cR)
is low, the qualih of the en~ironment improves wi[h a greater priority for public consumption.
Under these condi[ions, the beneficial impact on environmental quality of the fall in
employment and ou[pu[ domina[es the adverse eflect on the environment of less public
aba[ement and a higher resource intensity in production, and thus red and green preferences
are compatible.
If [he wage elastici[y of labour supply is negative and capital and resources are19
cooperant production factors, the demand for labour, resources and capital rises. However, if
the wage elas[icit} of labour suppl} is positice while the cost of resources does not affect the
demand for capital ~en much (or resources and capital are noncooperant production factors),
capital flight ma} oecur.
f'1 '. Dr~corerr uI r~r~~r ~~arural reso~u~ces
tiow consider the situation in which our small open economy discovers new national
natural resources (allowing for a higher extraction of RE). This may be referred to as an oil or
gas bonanza. In our framework we are, unfortunately, unable to address issues related to the
"Dutch Disease" fi.e. a contraction of the exposed sector and a boom in the sheltered sector).
Howe~er, we can examine the implications for taxation, public consumption and
en~ironmental poliec. In fac[, these are surprisingl} simple. A disco~ery of natural resources
generates, given that the} are fully owned or taxed b} the government, public revenue which
are entirely spent on public consumption -- see (31). Pri~ate utilit}, emplo}ment, domesticallc
employed capi[al, the MCPF, tas rates, and en~ironmental polic} are unaffected. To obtain
more interesting results, one may allow for private ownership of natural resources.
Alternati~el}, the case of a finite elasticity of substitution in social utility between public
consumption and en~ironmental quality may be analysed (see footnote ~). For this latter, more
general case, a disco~ery of natural resources induces a higher resource tax, a higher Ie~el of
abatement. and a lo~~er labour ta.c as well as a higher le~el of public consumption.
r~1.3. H,~her ~rurld `~ ic~ !or natura! resources
Here we touch on the implications of a higher world price of natural resources (i.e. an
increase in PR-). Such a shock exerts very similar efiects as a shift towards greener policies.
The reason is that bo[h shockS raise the user cost of resources. Consequently, they both shift
[he cost cur~e (19") in Figure 1 in the same way while leaving the demand cune (24)
unaffected, thereb} mo~ing the equilibrium from E to E'. Given the level of private welfare, a
higher resoure price is associa[ed with a lower distortionary tax level. If the labour suppl}
eur~e slopes upward Ibackward), this reduces (raises) the ~ICPF thereby expanding (reducing)
public spending at the expense of (to the benefit of) private welfare and the consumption
waee. Just as in the case of a green shock, both the labour tax and labour supply decline.
independent of the slope of the labour supply cune -- see (28) and (29).lo Furthermore, the
demand for capital is likely to fall. Only if labour supply is relatively inelastic and capital and
resources are noncooperant inputs, may the demand for capital rise.
Hhereas resource price and green shocks affect private welfare in the same way, their
consequences for public consumption and en~ironmental quality differ somewhat because of
lo Labour suppl} is unaffected if labour supply is perfectly inelastic (i.e. c~-0).zo
t~~o rzasons. First, whereas a higher priorit} for the environment raises public abatement, a
higher resource priee lea~es this category of public spending unaffected (see expression (15")).
This effect creates more room for public consumption in case of an increase in the resource
price compared to the case of a green shock (see (31)). The second difference between a green
and resource price shock is that an increase in the world market price for resources affects the
terms of trade. In particular, if it is a net exporter (importer) of natural resources, the
e.onom} becomes richer (poorer). The terms of trade effect is absorbed by public consumption
as the public sector owns the resources. Hence, the terms of trade gain (loss) benefits (harms)
public consumption at the expense (to the benefit of) the rest of the world. Even if the terms
of trade effeet is positi~e, public consumption ma} nevertheless fall in response to a higher
Norld price for resources. This will be the case if the labour suppl} curve bends backwards or
the resourre intensit~ of production is ~er} sensiti~e to [he user price of resources. ~1'ith a
negative (uncompensated) wage elas[icit} of labour supply, a lower labour tax rate raises the
~4CPF, thereb~ causing a shift awa} from public to pri~ate spending. If the demand for
resources is rather elastic, the higher price for resources causes producers to reduce their use
of resourees. This erodes the base of the resource taz and thus decreases the financial means
for financing public consumption. ~1'ith elastic resource demand, environmental quality
benefits from the lower level of public consumption. In fact, although public abatement does
not rise, en~ ironmental qualit} unambigiously benefits from a higher world market price for
natural resources. This is because emplo}ment declines while production becomes less resource
intensi~e (see ezpressions (6"), (-9), and (~3)J.
~'ll. E~tensions: En~ironmental qualih and production
l'll.L P~i(luuwt as a jut~rt uurr~~t
So far, wz assumed that the use of natural resources in the production process harms
the qualit~ of the natural en~ironment. .An alternati~e specification is to allow capital and
labour to produce ei[her more outpu[ of goods (Q) or less pollution (P), sa}
GIQ.P) - F(K,NL), Gq,FK,FyL~O, Gp~O, (32)
where F(.) is a conca~e neoclassical production function and G(.) allows for substitution
between output of goods and pollution. Using the implicit function theorem, we can rewrite
(3~) as a reduced form production function:
Q - F(K,NL.P). Fx-Fx, Gq,Fvt.-Fxt'GQ,Fp--GpiGQ~O. (32')
This specification of production and pollution (P) is closely related ro the one of production
and use of natural resources (R); i.e. pollution can also be seen as a factor of production.21
Pollution as specified in (32) seems a special case of production with natural resources as a
factor of production, i.e. production is separable between on the one hand capital and labour
and on the other hand pollution (or equivalently the use of natural resources). However, there
is an important difference in that, in contrast to the use of natural resources, there is generall}
no world market price for pollution other than a government tax.
I'll.L Be~relicial efl~~c~t ul em~tro~[me~ua! yualitr o~t productron
If en~ironmental qualit~ benefits productivit~ as well as utilit~, we ha~e:
Qp - a(E) F(K,NL,R), a'~0, a"~0, (33)
where Qp stands for domestic output of goods. A good example of en~ ironmental qualin
improving productivih ma~ be found in agriculture, where production typicallc benefits from
a better qualit~ of the soil and air. A better environmental qualin~ may also reduce congestion
and smog while impro~ing health and morale, thereby boosting productivity. According to
(33), environmental quality enhances the productivity of all inputs. An alternative
specifícation is that emironmental qualit~ affects labour rather than general productivit}.
The demands by firms for capital and natural resources relative to emplo~ment, (6).
are unaffected. However, the factor price frontier becomes
w t t~ - ~(PK .PR~ttR.E) (~,.,)
with GK--k, bR--r and pE-[a'(EIF(K,NL,R1 NL)~0. A better emironmental quality boosts the
marginal producti~it~' of labour and thus the wage. Total differentiation of (7"') ~ields (using
16i and (l~)):
d~i -~[(~g-mErRNL) dtg - dIL t~Ee'(A) dA], ~-(It~gELR w) t. (~,,,.)
The first-order conditions for the tax on resources and the tax on labour can with the aid of
(7""( be w ritten as:
~ Hw (4R-mErRNL) t uR t({~tR-NUE) NLrR - 0 116")
Hw - Nuw t NZUEvWr -~(tLtrtR)Nvw - p:VL~ ~ (17')
where H denotes the Lagrangian function for the government. Substituting ( l7') into ( 16"),
making use of ~R--r and rearranging, we obtaintR - INliE'U~Mo) p t t a'(E) F(K,NL,R). (18"')
The expressions for the optimal provision of public goods, (14), the optimal level of public
abatement, (IS), and the MCPF, (191, are unaffected.
The main difference with the case in which environmental quality benefits onlp utilit}
is that, in addition to a[erm [o correct for the consumption externality (cf. sec[ion IIL2), the
tax on renewable resources incorporates a[erm to take into account the adverse impact of
resource use on productivity. In contrast to the first term for the consumption externality, the
second term corresponding to the production effect does not involve the MCPF. This ma} ha~ e
important implications. In particular, if public funds become scarcer, the government's ability
[o differentiate ta.~ rates for en~ ironmental purposes is not necessarily affected and thus the
tax on resources does not need to fall. tiloreoser, the double dividend hypothesis may hold as a
eleaner en~ironment associated with greener preferences boosts labour producti.ity, thereby
raising wages.
~'111. Conclusions
This paper explored the implications of a number of shocks for optimal policy and
various macroeconomic ~ariables in the context of a second-best, small open econom~ with
environmental externalities in production. ~~e found that increased concern for the
envirenment reduces emplo~ment despite the factor substitution induced by a lower tax on
labour and a higher [ax on natural resources.
The 'pessimist' view on environmental policy maintains that a cleaner environment
requires a lower level of economic acti~ ih. Indeed, with a large uncompensated wage elasticity
of labour supply, emplo~ men[ and output ma~~ drop substantially in response to greener
preferences. The reason is that the higher environmental tax that is associated with greener
preferences is shifted towards labour. w'ith elastic labour supply, the resul[ing tower wage rate
e.terts a large ad~erse effec[ on labour supply. [f the marginal productivit~ of public
abatement talls rapidl~ with the le~el of abatement and if the input mix into production is not
ver} sensitive to [he user price of resources, most of the improvement in environmental quality
is achieved through a tower level of economic activity rather than a cleaner composition of
that activit}, thereby prociding support to the pessimist view. linder these conditions, red and
green preferences are compatible, i.e. public consumption rises with more concern for the
environment. Intui[ively, if the environment is improved through a lower level of output, the
disincentive effects of financing public consumption are less damaging. The pessimist scenario
is consistent with not only a lower level of employment but also capital flight.
The alternati~e 'optimist' view argues that a high environmental quality can be
reconciled to a high le~el of ou[pu[ because it can be achieved through a cleaner composition23
of economic acti~it~. If this is the case, optimal public consumption falls with more
en~ ironmental concern. ~~'hereas employment does not rise, the demand for capital ma} expand
if resourres are a close substitute for capital but not for labour.
ln future worh we plan to investigate in more detail the consequences of a beneficial
impact of environmental qualit~ on productivity. Moreover, we want to analyse optimal
en~ircnmental and tax policies in economies with involuntary unemplo~ment and
heterogeneous agents.
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